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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Annotated
section 78A-4-103(2)(J), the Utah Supreme Court having transferred the case to the Utah
Court of Appeals pursuant to Rule 42 (a) Rules of Appellate Procedure.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
~

~

Issue (a): Whether the trial court erred in determining that Utah Code Ann.
§ 38-2-7(7), which provides that: "An attorney's lien on real property has as its
priority the date and time when a notice of lien is filed with the county recorder in
which real property that is subject to a lien under this section is located," required
Appellant to file his Notice of Lien before the property was transferred to Appellee,
to have the lien on the property.
Standard of review. In interpreting a statute, the role of the Court is to read and
interpret its text. If the text is ambiguous, the Court may look to legislative history to
inform the construction of the statute. Myers v. Myers, 266 P.3d 806 (Utah 2011).

Determinative law.
Utah Code Ann. § 38-2-7. Compensation -- Attorney's lien.

14

( 1)
The compensation of an attorney is governed by agreement between the
attorney and a client, express or implied, which is not restrained by law.
(2)
An attorney shall have a lien for the balance of compensation due from a
client on any money or property owned by the client that is the subject of or
connected with work performed for the client, including:
(a)
any real, personal, or intangible property that is the subject of or
connected with the work performed for the client;
(b)
any funds held by the attorney for the client, including any amounts
paid as a retainer to the attorney by the client; and
(c)
any settlement, verdict, report, decision, or judgment in the client's
favor in any matter or action in which the attorney assisted, including any
proceeds derived from the matter or action, whether or not the attorney is
employed by the client at the time the settlement, verdict, report, decision,

1
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or judgment is obtained.
(3)
An attorney's lien commences at the time of employment of the attorney by
the client.
An attorney may enforce a lien under this section by moving to intervene in
(4)
a pending legal action in which the attorney has assisted or performed work, or by
filing a separate legal action. An attorney may not move to intervene in an action
or file a separate legal action to enforce a lien before 30 days has expired after a
· demand for payment has been made and not been complied with.
(5)
An attorney may file a notice of lien in a pending legal action in which the
attorney has assisted or performed work for which the attorney has a lien under
this section. In addition, an attorney may file a notice of lien with the county
recorder of the county in which real property that is subject to a lien under this
section is located. A notice of lien shall include the following:
(a)
the name, address, and telephone number of the attorney claiming
the lien;
(b)
the name of the client who is the owner of the property subject to the
lien;
(c)
a verification that the property is the subject of or connected with
work pciformed by the attorney for the client and that a demand for
payment of the amounts owed to the attorney for the work has been made
and the client did not pay the amounts owed within 30 days after the day on
which the attorney made the demand;
(d)
the date on which the attorney first provided services to the client;
(e)
a description of the property, sufficient for identification;
(f)
the signature of the lien claimant and an acknowledgment or
certificate as required under Title 57, Chapter 3, Recording of Documents.
(6)
Within 3 0 days after the day on which the notice of lien is filed, the attorney
shall deliver or mail by certified mail to the client a copy of the notice of lien.
(7)
Any person who takes an interest in any property, other than real property,
that is subject to an attorney's lien with actual or constructive knowledge of the
attorney's lien, takes his or her interest subject to the attorney's lien. An attorney's
lien on real property has as its priority the date and time when a notice of lien is
filed with the county recorder of the county in which real property that is subject to
a lien under this section is located.
(10) This section does not alter or diminish in any way an attorney's common
law retaining lien rights.
§ 57-3-103 Effect of Failure to Record.
Each document not recorded as provided in this title is void as against any
subsequent purchaser of the same real property, or any portion of it, if:
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( 1) the subsequent purchaser purchased the property in good faith and for a
valuable consideration; and
(2) the subsequent purchaser's document is first duly recorded.

~

Issue (b): Whether the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 38-2-7(7) provides
priority to the appellee, and what is the extent of the priority with respect to
Appellant and other creditors, where the appellee had actual knowledge of the
attorney's lien and had not purchased the real property in good faith and for a
valuable consideration as required by Utah Code Ann. § 57-3-103(1), where
subsequent purchaser must have purchased the property in good faith and for a
valuable consideration.
Standard of review. This is a question of law to be reviewed for correctness.
'"Matters of statutory construction are questions of law that are reviewed for
correctness."' State in re D. B., 2002 UT App 314, ,r 6, 57 P.3d 1102 (quoting Platts v.
Parents Helping Parents, 947 P.2d 658, 661 (Utah 1997)); Fisher v. Fisher, 67 P.3d 1055,
1057 (Utah App. 2003). The issue was raised before the trial court who failed to address
the question.

Determinative law.
Utah Code Ann.§ 38-2-7. Compensation --Attorney's lien.
(7)
.... An attorney's lien on real property has as its priority the date and
time when a notice of lien is filed with the county recorder of the county in which
real property that is subject to a lien under this section is located.

Utah Code Ann.§ 57-3-103 Effect of Failure to Record.
Each document not recorded as provided in this title is void as against any
subsequent purchaser of the same real property, or any portion of it, if:
the subsequent purchaser purchased the property in good faith and
( 1)
for a valuable consideration; and
(2)
the subsequent purchaser's document is first duly recorded.
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Issue (c): Did the trial court err in stating in paragraph 2 of its Order that
"Mr. Fadel's Complaint is DISMISSED with prejudice and on the merits?" (Order
of Dismissal, ,r,r 1 and 2.)
Standard of review. Because the propriety of a rule 12(b)( 6) dismissal is a
question of law, the appellate court gives the trial court's ruling no deference and reviews
it under a correction standard. Alvarez v. Galeka, 933 P.2d 987, 989 (Utah 1997).
Issue (d): Whether the trial court's dismissal with prejudice of the
appellant's complaint under rule 12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure was
proper as a matter of law.
Standard of review. The Supreme Court reviews the grant of a motion to dismiss
for correctness, granting no deference to the decision of the district court. Hudgens v.
Prosper, Inc., 243 P.3d 1275, 1279 (Utah 2010). When determining whether the trial
court properly granted a 12 (b) (6) motion to dismiss, the Court accepts the factual
allegations in the complaint as true and considers them and all reasonable inferences to be
drawn from them in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. Webster v. J.P. Morgan Chase
Bank NA, 290 P .3d 930, 931 (Utah App. 2012).
Issue (e): Did the district court err in deciding the issues raised by the
complaint as a summary judgment matter, where the only pleading on record was
the complaint?
Standard of review. Because propriety of dismissal for failure to state a claim is
a question of law, the reviewing court gives the trial court's ruling no deference and
reviews it under a correctness standard. Alvarez v. Galetka, 933 P.2d 987, 989 (Utah
1997); Whipple v. American Fork Irr. Co., 910 P.2d 1218, 1219 (Utah 1995).
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Issue (f): Did the trial court err in paragraph 8 of the Order, in stating that
there is no dispute that "there was a mediation on October 20, 2011, and that there
was a settlement that flowed from the mediation," where the only connection with
mediation was that the settlement was on the same date as mediation; where it
would seem unlikely and improper for the mediator to participate in settlement
agreements in absence of Fadel with whom the mediator contracted; and where a
settlement without Fadel would be a breach of the mediator's contract with Fadel?
Standard of review. The trial court's conclusions of law are reviewed for
correctness. Gottling v. P.R. Inc., 61 P.3d 989 (Utah 2002).

Issue (g): Whether the trial court erred in awarding attorney's fees to the
appellee pursuant to Utah Code Ann.§ 78B-5-825.
Standard of review. As stated by the Court of Appeals in Tuttle v. Olds, 155 P.3d
893, 897 (Utah App. 2007):
[10] 1 14 A rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss is not an opportunity for the trial
court to decide the merits of a case: "Rule l 2(b )( 6) concerns the sufficiency of the
pleadings, not the underlying merits of a particular case." Alvarez v. Gletka, 933
P.2d 987, 989 (Utah 1997). A reviewing court is "obliged to construe the
complaint in a light most favorable to the plaintiff and to indulge all reasonable
inferences in its favor." Heiner v. S.J. Groves & Sons Co., 790 P.2d 107, 109
(Utah Ct.App.1990). Reviewing courts may only affirm a rule 12(b)(6) dismissal
if "It appears to a certainty that the plaintiff would not be entitled to relief under
any state of facts which could be proved in support of its claims."
The Utah Supreme Court in Pang v. International Document Services, 356 P.3d
1190, 1195 (Utah 2015) stated that "[e]ven bad arguments are not necessarily frivolouswe sanction attorneys for frivolous appeals only in the most "egregious cases" where an
obviously meritless appeal "results in the delay of a proper judgment."

Determinative law.
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-825. Attorney fees -- Award where action or defense
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in bad faith -- Exceptions.
( 1)
In civil actions, the court shall award reasonable attorney fees to a
prevailing party if the court determines that the action or defense to the action was
without merit and not brought or asserted in good faith, except under Subsection
(2). [(2) not applicable].

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. Nature of the Case
This is a suit by Fadel to foreclose a statutory attorney lien upon property owned
by the Trustee of THE WILMA G. PARKIN FAMILY PROTECTION TRUST, which
consisted of a tract of real property situated at about 362 South Main Street, Bountiful,
Utah, and the claim of past due rentals owed by Deseret for use of said tract. Deseret now
claims ownership of the tract after receiving a warranty deed from the Trustee on October
20, 2011, rather than from Deseret's suit to quiet title to the tract filed August 27, 2009.
Fadel commenced services to the Trustee in May, 2009, relative to quiet title
claims of Deseret. The written Attorney-Client Agreement between Fadel and the Trustee

~.

is set out in the Complaint, and is dated February 18, 2010. It recites that representation
began May 2009, an Answer & Counterclaim against Deseret has been filed, and the
attorney's compensation will be one-half of amounts recovered measured in cash,
property or both free from claim from Deseret, which could result in the Attorney
obtaining a joint interest in the land with the Trustee after deducting $10,000.00. The
ownership of the land by the Trustee was established by the trial court's denial of
Deseret' s motion for summary judgment on the quiet title claim. The ownership of the
6
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tract by the Trustee, having been proved and then acknowledged by Deseret by
demanding a General Warranty Deed is proof of amounts to be considered as "recovered"
under the terms of the Attorney-Client Agreement.
~

B. Court of Proceedings and Disposition at Trial Court
This appeal is from a final Order of Dismissal of the Second District Court for
Weber County, Utah, the Honorable Noel S. Hyde, District Judge, granting the
defendant's Motion to Dismiss, pursuant to rule 12(b)(6), failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted, and rule 12(b)(7), failure to join an indispensable party. The
Order recites that "Mr. Fadel's Complaint is DISMISSED with prejudice and on the
merits."
C. Statement of Relevant Facts
The Complaint alleges facts supporting the following:
Wilma G. Parkin, Trustee of the Wilma G. Parkin Trust, dated July 9, 1999 (Trust), died
August 12, 2004. Her son, Jerry W. Parkin is named as successor trustee to the Trust,
which was the record owner of the real property adjoining a building constructed by
South Davis Credit Union. South Davis had contracted in 1984 to buy the Wilma G.
Parkin tract, which they rented to others until demolishing the office building on the tract
to use the tract as a parking area for a new office building, situated on the comer lot,
south thereof. Deseret took possession of the new South Davis building in the early
1990' s after the Commissioner of Financial Institution of Utah took possession of South
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Davis and designated the National Credit Union Administration (NCHA) as liquidator,
and continued to use the Parkin tract as a parking lot for the new building.
In May, 2009, Jerry W. Parkin (Jerry) was informed by a relative that Deseret was
negotiating with the Davis County Treasurer to buy the Parkin tract at the May tax sale
for nonpayment of taxes for the prior four years. Jerry had no knowledge of the Trust's
ownership until contacting George K. Fadel, attorney (Fadel), who obtained from the
recorder a copy of a Quitclaim deed made by Wilma to the Trust dated July 9, 1999.
Fadel contacted a Deseret official, who claimed to have an assignment of the
Uniform Real Estate Contract from South Davis and title under that agreement. Deseret,
through its attorney, notified Fadel that Deseret would only pay the Trust $2,357.14,
which the Trust had borrowed from Jerry's uncle to pay the delinquent taxes.
Deseret filed a complaint on August 27, 2009, to quiet title to the 66 foot frontage
tract of the Trust, alleging that "in the early 1990's South Davis sold and assigned all of
its rights, interest and obligations under the Installment Contract and in the property to
Deseret First."
Fadel entered an appearance and filed a Verified Answer and Counterclaim and
demand for jury trial on February 19, 2010, advancing costs, since the Trust was without
funds. The Trust has not reimbursed Fadel for the advanced costs and subsequent
expenses incurred in its litigation. No written agreement was made between Fadel and
the Trust until the written Attorney-Client Agreement was executed February 18, 2010.

8
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The highest offer ofDeseret up to February 2010 was the sum of $10,000.00 for a deed of
conveyance. The Attorney-Client Agreement provided in part:
Attorney and Trustee hereby agree that the compensation due to the Attorney for
past service and continued service in the District Court, unless sooner resolved,
will be one-half of the amounts recovered by settlement or judgment and/or
judgment in excess of $10,000. The amounts recovered are to be measured by the
value received by cash or property or both free from claim from Deseret which
could result in the Attorney obtaining a joint interest in the land with the Trustee
after deducting $10,000.
On October 29, 2010, Fadel took the depositions of Shane C. London, the
executive vice-president of Deseret, who admitted that Deseret received nothing from
South Davis (Bonneville) by assignment and claimed that Deseret had a Purchase and
Assumption Agreement (P&A) with the NCUA. Deseret filed a motion for summary
judgment on the assignment of contract claim, which was denied by the district court,
whereupon Deseret moved to amend its complaint to claim title under the P &A from
NCUA. No amended complaint was filed after the denial ofDeseret's motion for
summary judgment.
Upon recommendation of the court, the parties agreed to mediate pursuant to UCA
§ 78B-6-201 to promote a mutually acceptable resolution or settlement. The mediation
agreement, "Commercial Mediation Agreement Karen S. Hobbs, Esq.," provided in the
first sentence that "The undersigned agree to mediate with Karen S. Hobbs as the
mediator in the case ofDeseret First Federal Credit Union v. Wilma G. Parkin Family
Trust for the purpose of compromising, settling or resolving disputed claims. The

9
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undersigned agree as follows." Paragraph 1 begins by stating that "All participants agree
to participate in good faith .... " The names of the "undersigned" included Gregory S.
Moesinger, attorney for Deseret, an officer ofDeseret, George K. Fadel, attorney for
Wilma G. Parkin Family Trust, and other handwritten signatures of Dennis Parkin, Jerry
Parkin, and Lewis Provostgard.
Mediation began at 9:00 a.m. at the offices of Kirton & McConkie and continued
until about 1:30 p.m., at which time Jerry W. Parkin insisted upon accepting an offer
against the advice of Fadel. All persons, except Fadel, departed the conference room and
Fadel had no communication with any "participants" thereafter other than with Moesinger
in court related filings. There was no mediated settlement agreement among the
participants. The mediator made no written report and it is not known to what extent she
participated in connection with settlement documents, none of which bear a signature of
the mediator, and the only mention of the mediator was a statement that Deseret agrees to
·pay the costs of Karen Hobs for the Parties.
The Attorney-Client Agreement was shown to the mediator by Jerry Parkin before
they departed from the conference room on October 20, 2011.
In absence ofFadel's services, Deseret could not have received the General
Warranty Deed, which is Deseret's sole claim to title to the tract. Fadel's service resulted
in a recovery which confirmed the title of the Trust, which Deseret claims to have
acquired by the General Warranty Deed.

10
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~

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Fadel began services at the request of Jerry W. Parkin, successor trustee to his
mother's Trust, which owned a tract of land that was the subject of a proposed tax sale,
~

which Deseret had communicated with the county assessor to purchase at May tax sale.
The Trust had borrowed money to redeem the property from tax sale. Fadel, being an
acquaintance of Jerry, undertook to investigate the issues by reviewing county records
and communicating with a representative ofDeseret regarding the possession of the
ownership of the tract, after Jerry's mother had contracted in 1984 to sell the same to the
South Davis Credit Union, and Jerry did not know that his mother had conveyed the tract
to her Trust by Quitclaim Deed, dated July 9, 1999. Deseret claimed to have an

019

assignment of a Uniform Real Estate Contract from South Davis Credit Union and
brought suit to quiet title based upon that assignment. Deseret later admitted it had no
assignment of contract from South Davis and then moved to amend its complaint to allege
acquisition of title in connection with a purchase agreement with the National Credit
Union Administration in connection with the seizure of South Davis (Bonneville Credit
Union) by the state financial agency.
The trial court denied Deseret' s motion for summary judgment on its assignment
of contract claim and recommended mediation. Mediation terminated as stated in
paragraph 9 of the Complaint. Fadel was a necessary party to the mediation, as stated by
the mediator's Notice of Mediation Conference, addressed to Deseret's attorneys and to
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Fadel stating the time and place of mediation and concluding with the following
paragraph:
The mediation has been set by mutual agreement of the parties involved. Please
allow the entire day to guarantee adequate time to conduct the mediation.
Attorneys are expected to bring their clients, claims representatives or any other
individuals with settlement authority. Payment is due at the conclusion of the
mediation unless other arrangements are made.
Fadel was clearly a necessary party to mediation and no "mediation" agreement could be
concluded without his consent.
The settlement arrived at by Deseret' s attorneys dealing directly with the trustee,
without consent of Fadel, is a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct. Also, the
involvement of Shaffer, by telephone, purporting to act as attorney for the Trust without
having been substituted for Fadel, the attorney of record, is a violation of the Rules of
Professional Conduct. Both of said violations should be considered as bad faith and as
reasons for granting enforcement ofFadel's attorney's lien.
~

Without the extensive services of Fadel, the Trust would have received nothing,
and Deseret would not have received a title to the tract. Ownership by the Trust was the
basis of recovery of both entities. Deseret paid $30,000.00 to the trustee for a General
Warranty Deed, its only record claim to the tract, and as such cannot deny that the Trust
owned the property, which was encumbered by the attorney lien. Thus, Deseret bargained
with a distressed trustee for the interest of the Trust in the land and rental claims, and now
Deseret should pay the attorney for his contractual interest valued as stated in paragraph 6
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of the Complaint.
The Utah court of Appeals, in the case of Eastman v. Earl, 912 P .2d 994, 996
(Utah App. 1996) cited Potter v. Ajax Mining Co., 19 Utah 421, 57 P. 270, 279 (1899)
"(holding defendant who had notice of plaintiffs attorney lien could not fraudulently
defeat lien by settling directly with plaintiff, without knowledge of plaintiffs attorney)."

Eastman v. Earl at 996. The issues in Potter v. Ajax are similar to the issues important to
resolution of the instant case. Following are some excerpts from Potter v. Ajax that are
relevant and determinative precedent.
The plaintiff, who was injured in a mining accident, employed Attorney Page, et
al. to recover damage from Ajax under a written contract for "one half of any amount that
may be recovered, either by way of judgment or settlement of said cause," and "that the
attorneys should advance the necessary costs and witness fees." Potter v. Ajax, 19 Utah
421 at 426.
While the case was pending, an attorney for Ajax's insurance company went to
Payson, where the plaintiff resided, and without consulting the plaintiffs attorneys,
induced Plaintiff to execute a release and discharge in consideration of $1,000.00. The
attorneys entered a motion based upon affidavit to set aside the order dismissing the
plaintiffs cause of action and the trial court set aside the dismissal to prosecute the lien
claim. See id. at 427.
The attorneys based their right upon Sec. 135, Rev. Stat. 1898, which contains the

13
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following language:
The compensation of an attorney and counselor for his services is governed
by agreement, express or implied, which is not restrained by law. From the
commencement of an action or the service of an answer containing a counterclaim,
the attorney who appears for a party has a lien upon his client's cause of action or
counterclaim, which attaches to a verdict, report, decision, or judgment in his
client's favor, and the proceeds thereof in whosesoever hands they may come; and
can not be affected by any settlement between the parties before or after judgment.
Id. at 428-29. The Court stated:
The language of Sec. 135, if applicable to this case, is comprehensive, and
creates a direct lien in favor of the attorney upon his client's cause of action,
whatever form it may assume in the entire course of litigation, and entitles the
attorney to follow the proceeds without regard to any settlement, before or after the
judgment. It being a statutory lien every one must take notice of it, and any one
settling with the client, without the knowledge of the attorney, does so at his own
risk.
In common fairness to an attorney, no settlement should be made by the
party where an attorney has an interest, without full knowledge of the attorney, and
under such conditions as will protect his lien. The attorney being an officer of the
court, is under its control, and no unfair demands on his part should be permitted
by the court. Under the statute the attorney is entitled to such legal fees and
allowances as he can establish by agreement with his client, which is not restrained
by law. This agreement, however, does not deprive the party of the right to control
the management of his case and determine when the litigation shall cease,
providing he is able and willing to satisfy the just claim of his attorney.
Id. at 430.
The Court continued:
Upon full examination of the record we find that the settlement and
dismissal of the action as shown by the proof, was collusive, fraudulent, and
prejudicial to the rights of the attorneys for the plaintiff, and was made for the
purpose of cheating and defrauding them out of their just compensation for
services rendered and agreed to be rendered in that action, of which fact the
guaranty Company, through its attorney, had actual notice.
The order setting aside and vacating the satisfaction and dismissal of the
14
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action so collusively and fraudulently obtained could properly be made by the
court under the common law to protect one of its officers from the fraud of his
client. In permitting the attorneys to continue the prosecution of the case, so as to
determine the amount of the lien for their compensation for services in the action,
as agreed between them and their client, was a proper mode of reaching the
amount of their compensation, without reference to the statute, under the proof of
fraud shown in this case. The attorneys were entitled to proceed to judgment under
the rules established by courts to protect attorneys from dishonest clients. But the
plaintiff in this case did not see fit to adopt the course of procedure so established.
The attorneys for the plaintiff based their right to have the dismissal set aside and
the cause tried alone upon Section 135, Rev. Stat. This statute did not go into
effect until Jan., 1898. It gave the attorneys certain rights, but was not remedial in
its nature. It was not retroactive in its operation, and id not affect the plaintiffs
cause of action or suit brought upon the contract made, before the statute became
operative.

Id. at 432-33. The Supreme Court remanded the case for trial under issues of common
law because the action was commenced before the statute became effective.
Accordingly, the attorney lien is enforceable under common law rules as well as by
statute. The statute was not a necessary factor in Potter v. Ajax. Fadel's attorney lien
should be granted priority and foreclosed under the holdings of Potter v. Ajax and as
further supported by Utah Code Ann. § 3 8-2-7.

~

POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE STATUTE PROVIDES
PRIORITY FOR DESERET'S RECORDING A DEED, RENDERING
APPELLANT'S LIEN UNENFORCEABLE.
Paragraph 32 of the trial court's Order states:
Mr. Fadel's attorney's lien in this case in not enforceable at law because it did not
attach with any priority to the real property before the Trust conveyed the real
property to Deseret First, based upon the specific provisions of Utah Code§ 38-215
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

7; and further, there is nothing that has been argued to the Court as a matter of
equity that would justify the extension of that lien of the real property in the hands
of Deseret First.
The court acknowledged that Fadel has a lien, but stated the same was not enforceable
because of the priority provisions of the statute.
Section 38-2-7 (3) provides: "An attorney's lien commences at the time of
employment of the attorney by the client." Subsection (7) reads:
Any person who takes an interest in any property, other than real property, that is
subject to an attorney's lien with actual or constructive knowledge of the
attorney's lien, takes his or her interest subject to the attorney's lien. An attorney's
lien on real property has as its priority the date and time when a notice of lien is
filed with the county recorder of the county in which real property that is subject to
a lien under this section is located.
The last sentence of subsection (7) deals only with priority as to real property. Fadel's
claim against Deseret has priority by reason of actual notice.
Subsection (7) should be interpreted to apply to bona fide purchasers of real
property and be limited by the provisions of Utah Code Ann.§ 57-3-103:

§ 57-3-103 Effect of Failure to Record.
Each document not recorded as provided in this title is void as against any
subsequent purchaser of the same real property, or any portion of it, if:
(I) the subsequent purchaser purchased the property in good faith and for a
valuable consideration; and
(2) the subsequent purchaser's document is first duly recorded.
Deseret was not a "subsequent purchaser," who purchased the property in good faith and
for a valuable consideration.
There has been a long ago determination by the Utah Supreme Court, as stated in
16
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the case of Pender v. Bird, that "one who procures a quitclaim deed for a nominal sum of
money after being advised that the grantor does not own the property, can neither assert in
good faith that he purchased the property without notice of any infirmity in the title, nor
that he is a purchaser for value." 227 P.2d 1057, 1059 (Utah 1950). The Court further
ruled:
Unquestionably the defendant knew that he was purchasing a suspicious and
speculative title for a sum hardly more than sufficient to defray the cost of
executing the deed. The [recording] statute was not enacted to protect one whose
ignorance of the title is deliberate and intentional, nor does a mere nominal
consideration satisfy the requirement that a valuable consideration must be paid.
Its purpose is to protect the man who honestly believes he is acquiring a good title
and who invests some substantial sum in reliance on that belief.
Id. at 1060.
vi

Utah cases regarding priorities in claims related to real property hold that a
subsequent purchaser must therefore show that he had no actual notice, i.e., no personal
knowledge of a prior conveyance or that the prior conveyance did not impart constructive
notice and that the recording act is a race-notice statute, which requires lack of actual
notice or of prior recording for a subsequent purchaser to prevail in multiple conveyances
of the same lands. See Salt Lake County v. Metro West, 89 P.3d 155, 161 (Utah 2004)
("To take free of an unrecorded interest under Utah's Recording Statute, a subsequent
purchaser must purchase the property in good faith without notice of any defect in his
grantor's title."); Pender v. Bird, 227 P.2d 1057, 1059 (Utah 1950) ("[o]ne who procures

VJJ

a quitclaim deed for a nominal sum of money after being advised that the grantor does not
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own the property, can neither assert in good faith that he purchased the property without
notice of any infirmity in the title, nor that he is a purchaser for value."); Northcrest Inc.

v. Walker Bank & Trust Co.,248 P.2d 692,697 (Utah 1952).
The use of the words "shall have a lien" in§ 38-2-7(a)(2) is mandatory and cannot
be diminished by the provisions of§ 38-2-7(5), which allows filing a "notice of lien" in
stating that "( 5) An attorney may file a notice of lien in a pending legal action." As such,
the lien is not lost if for any reason that "notice of lien" is deemed deficient. See Reeve &

Associates, Inc. v. Tanner, 355 P.3d 232,238 (Utah App. 2015) ("The Attorney Fee
Statute's use of the word "shall" mandates award of attorney fees to the prevailing party,"
citing UCA § 38-1-18.); Utah Farm Production Credit v. Wasatch Bank, 734 P.2d 904,
906 (Utah 1986) (note 2); Citimortgage, Inc. v. Stephenson, 793 Utah Adv. Rep. 74, 2015
UT App 205 (Utah App. 2015) (note 4); Salt Lake County v. Metro West, 89 P.3d 155,
161 (Utah 2004) ("To take free of an unrecorded interest under Utah's Recording Statute,
a subsequent purchaser must purchase the property in good faith without notice of any
defect in his grantor's title.")
Under the former statute UCA § 78-51-41, 1953, the attorney has a lien, which the
Supreme Court held in Petrie v. General Contracting Company, 17 Utah 2d 408 (Utah
1966) that where the recovery is real estate, the lien attaches to it, and the attorney owned
one-third of the mining claims in question. The former statute UCA § 78-51-41 (1953)
recited that the lien attaches to a verdict, report, decision or judgment in the client's favor
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and to the proceeds thereof, whereas the amendment through UCA § 38-2-7(2)(a)
provides for an attorney's lien for the balance of compensation due from a client on
moneys or property owned by the client that is the subject of or connected with work
performed for the client, including, but not limited to: "(a) any real or personal property
that is the subject of or connected with work performed for the client." See Midvale
~

Motors Inc. v. Saunders, 442 P.2d 939, 940 (Utah 1968), which also holds that ''while a
party may discharge his attorney with or without cause, the attorney should not withdraw
from the case except for good cause." Fadel was replaced, but never discharged by the
client, and has never withdrawn from the case.
Fadel did not have to record a notice of lien or mail a notice in order to foreclose
the lien against Deseret' s claims. An attorney's lien commences at the time of
employment according to § 3 8-2-7 (3 ), and by § 3 8-2-7 (4), an attorney may intervene or

vJ

file an action to enforce a lien 30 days after demand for payment has not been complied
with. Subsection 38-2-7 (5) is permissive, not mandatory, to provide time for suit
beyond the 30 day waiting period and to provide constructive notice to innocent persons.
To the extent that the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 38-2-7 (3), that the
attorney's lien commences at the time of employment, and §38-2-7 (4)'s 30 day
requirement, conflict with subsection (7) on priority of recording, the conflicts should be
treated as stated by the Supreme Court in Worthen v. Shurtleff and Andrews, Inc., 426
P.2d 223 (Utah 1967):
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Where there is such conflict in the provisions of statutes it is improper to place all
of the emphasis on either provision to the exclusion of the other. They should be
considered together and it is proper to examine into the background and purpose as
well as to the language of the statute to discover what the legislative intent was as
to which should have priority.

Id. at 225.
Subsection (7) should not afford Deseret a priority over the attorney lien in view of
the other considerations set forth above. If constructive notice were intended by
subsection (7), it should be subordinate to actual notice provisions of court decisions,
cited above on pages 16-18.

POINT II.
ASSUMING THAT DESERET CAN CLAIM PRIORITY UNDER UCA § 38-2-7
(7), THE PRIORITY IS LIMITED TO THE CONSIDERATION PAID.
The law as to the specific question as to the extent of priority is not clear, however,
the dictionary definition of "bona fide purchaser for value" contained in Black's law
Dictionary, Seventh edition, concludes with a statement that the bona fide purchaser for

value "has a superior right to the transferred property as against the transferor's creditor
to the extent of the consideration that the purchaser had paid."
Also, a recent decision of the Utah Supreme Court, filed July 28, 2015, No.
060911956, 355 P.3d 1000 (Utah 2015), Gregory N Jones v. Mackey price Thompson &
Ostler, at page 1021 states:

,I7 5 Our Butler decision also holds, however, that if the value of property
the transferee received was greater than the value of the transferee's legitimate
20
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

preference, then the excess is available to the other creditors. So even if the
Thompson & Skousen Defendants did not act in bad faith, Mr. Jones might
nevertheless have a valid claim under the Fraudulent Transfer Act if he could show
that they received more than the value of their "legitimate preference." But Mr.
Jones makes no attempt to do so in his opening brief. Only in his reply brief does
he raise this issue, and we "will not consider matters raised for the first time in the
reply brief." Accordingly, we conclude that he has failed to raise a genuine issue
of fact concerning this claim.
The reasoning of the Court in Jones v. Mackey should be considered by the Court in the
determination of the extent of any priority of the appellee, if the appellee is found to be a
bona fide purchaser for value.
The attorney lien of Fadel is provided for by statute§ 38-2-7 (1) and (2):
The compensation of an attorney is governed by agreement between the
( 1)
attorney and a client, express or implied, which is not restrained by law.
(2)
An attorney shall have a lien for the balance of compensation due from a
client on any money or property owned by the client that is the subject of or
connected with work performed for the client, including:
(a)
any real, personal, or intangible property that is the subject of or
connected with the work performed for the client;
(b)
any funds held by the attorney for the client, including any amounts
paid as a retainer to the attorney by the client; and
(c)
any settlement, verdict, report, decision, or judgment in the client's
favor in any matter or action in which the attorney assisted, including any
proceeds derived from the matter or action, whether or not the attorney is
employed by the client at the time the settlement, verdict, report, decision,
or judgment is obtained.
Paragraph 5 of the Complaint sets forth the Attorney-Client Agreement, dated February
18, 2010, and recites that the attorney's compensation will be one-half of the amounts
recovered by settlement or judgment and/or judgment in excess of $10,000.00. "The
amounts recovered are to be measured by the value received by cash or property or both
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free from claim from Deseret which could result in the Attorney obtaining a joint interest

in the land with the Trustee after deducting $10,000.00."
Deseret's motion to dismiss alleges that it is pursuant to Rules 7, 12 (b) (6) and 12
(b) (7). The factual allegations of the Complaint are taken as true and they and all
inferences drawn from them are considered in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. See
Golding v. Ashley Cent. TRR Co., 793 P .2d, 897, 898 (Utah 1990).
~

Some other factual allegations of the Complaint to be considered as true are:

6. The value of the land is at least $150,000.00 and accrued rentals owed
by Deseret reasonably exceed $150,000.00. Accordingly, George K. Fadel is
entitled to one-half ownership in the tract as tenant in common and to one-half of
the provable rental owed by Deseret, pursuant to the express terms of the AttorneyClient Agreement.
7. ***
It is now clear that the defendant has never had title to be quieted against
the Trust, by the acknowledgement ofDeseret's counsel, Mr. Gregory S.
Moesinger, in open court and of record on August 12, 2012, where he claimed that
Deseret obtained good legal title to the Property by General Warranty Deed from
the successor Trustee. Deseret has no claim to the Property other than by said
General Warranty Deed.
Based upon the foregoing facts taken as true, and assuming Deseret's priority of
$30,000.00, Fadel is entitled to foreclose his lien upon the land for one-half of its value,
$75,000.00 less $30,000.00, and upon the rental claim for $75,000.00 less $10,000.00 for
a principal total of $110,000.00.
Paragraph 13 of the Complaint, taken as true, references the Answer and
Counterclaim filed in the subject litigation. The establishment of the ownership of the
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Trust to the land provides the basis for rental for use of the land.
~

Deseret is equally liable for Fadel's claim, and the case of Eastman v. Earl, 912
P.2d 994 (Utah App. 1996) cites Potter v. Ajax Mining Co., 19 Utah 421, 57 P. 270,279
(1899) holding defendant who had notice of plaintiffs attorney lien could not
fraudulently defeat lien by settling directly with plaintiff, without knowledge of plaintiffs
~

attorney. Eastman v. Earl at 996.

POINT III.
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT WITH
PREJUDICE AND ON THE MERITS.
The district court dismissed the complaint with prejudice and on the merits. The
dismissal with prejudice rather than dismissal without prejudice is a drastic remedy,
which is generally appropriate only if it appears a certainty that a plaintiff cannot state a
claim. Alvarez/ Galtka, 933 P.2d 987, 991 (Utah 1997); see America West Bank

Members, L.C. v. State, 342 P.3d 224, 237-38 (Utah 2014) (citing Bonneville Tower v.
Thompson Michie Assoc. 728 P .2d 1017 (Utah 1986) a per curiam decision which held
that "Our rules of procedure are intended to encourage the adjudication of disputes on
their merits;" and Alvarez/ Galtka, 933 P.2d 987, 991 (Utah 1997) that it is also a
general rule that a "dismissal under rule 12(b)(6) generally is not final or on the merits
and the court normally will give Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint.").
¼17
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POINT IV.
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DECIDING THE ISSUES AS A SUMMARY
JUDGMENT MATTER, WHERE THE ONLY PLEADING ON RECORD WAS
THE COMPLAINT.
Rule 7 (a) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure lists the only pleadings that are allowed,
none of which were filed by Deseret. Rule 7 (b) provides for motions.
The decision of the Utah Court of Appeals in the case of Tuttle v. Olds, 155 P.3d
893 (Utah App. 2007) supports Appellant's assertion that the district court erred in
dismissing the complaint with prejudice on the merits where the only pleading was that of
the complaint. The Utah Court of appeals held:
[2] if7 Plaintiffs claim that the trial cou..1: should be reversed for treating
Defendants' rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss as a rule 12(c) motion for judgment
on the pleadings. See Utah R. Civ. P. 12(c). In its order granting the motion, the
trial court referred to the motion as one for a judgment on the pleadings, despite a
reminder from Defendants that their motion was one to dismiss under l 2(b)(6).
Because Defendants never filed an answer to the complaint, the pleadings were not
closed at the time the trial court granted the so-called judgment on the pleadings.
A motion for a judgment on the pleadings cannot be made, let alone granted, prior
to the closing of the pleadings. See id. (stating that 12(c) motions are to be made
after the pleadings have been closed). We will therefore review the trial court's
decision as if it had correctly referred to the granted motion as one for dismissal
under rule 12(b)(6).
Id. at 896. The appellee did not move the court to treat the rule 12(b) (6) motion as one

for summary judgment.
The only pleading being that of the complaint the court should have limited its
consideration to whether a claim for relief had been alleged. The Court of Appeals in
Tuttle v. Olds further held:
24
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[3 ,4] ,r 8 Plaintiffs claim that in dismissing the case, the trial court improperly
considered material outside the pleadings. If a court considers material outside the
pleadings in deciding a rule 12(b)( 6) motion to dismiss, the court must convert the
motion into one for summary judgment. See Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b). This rule
12(b) conversion process includes giving the parties reasonable notice and
opportunity to submit all pertinent summary judgment materials for the court's
consideration. See id.; Hebertson v. Willowcreek Plaza, 923 P.2d 1389, 1391
(Utah 1996); Strand v. Associated Students of Univ. of Utah, 561 P .2d 191, 193
(Utah 1977). The notice and opportunity to submit requirements are especially
important with respect to the party against whom judgment is entered. See Strand,
561 P.2d at 193 (stating that the opportunity for the non-moving party to submit
rule 56 material is particularly important). Our rules provide that complaints and
answers constitute pleadings.
Id. A motion to dismiss under rule 12 (b) (6) cannot be treated as a rule 12 (c) motion for
judgment on the pleadings.
Deseret's motion to dismiss was based upon rule 12 (b) (6) "failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted." At no time did Deseret file a motion under rule 12 ( c),
motion for judgment on the pleadings. It is only in connection with a motion for
vi)

judgment on the pleadings that the court can treat the motion as one for summary
judgment pursuant to rule 56. Accordingly, the trial court was limited to the
determination of whether the complaint failed to state a claim for relief. Procedure under

1/jJ

rule 56 requires that "all parties shall be given reasonable opportunities to present all
material made pertinent to such a motion by rule 56. The court limited Fadel's oral
argument as shown by the transcript, pages 11-12:
THE COURT: I'll allow a maximum of five minutes on the history. I've
read the history in the documents.
l\1R. FADEL: All right.
THE COURT: And the Court allocated 30 minutes to this hearing. Mr.
25
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Moesinger took a little more than half of that time, so I'm going to give some
latitude to you to take a little additional time as well. But please be aware that I'm
not extending this hearing indefinitely, and if you want to take five minutes to
review a summary of the facts, I've already reviewed them, but I'll give you a
maximum of five minutes, but that's going to shorten the time that you're going to
have on other argument.
The court should have limited its consideration only on the question of failing to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted.
Rule 8, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, as to claims for relief requires "an original
claim ... shall contain a short and plain: ( 1) statement of the claim showing that the party
is entitled to relief; and (2) a demand for judgment for specified relief.
Plaintiff's seven page complaint in the subject action contains factual allegations
identifying the parties and the real property by legal description, which was owned by
Wilma G. Parkin, who conveyed the tract to her Trust in 1999; Deseret was in possession
of the tract and endeavored to purchase the same at tax sale, which was prevented when
Wilma's son, as successor trustee, paid the delinquent tax; Trustee employed Fadel to
recover possession of the tract and signed a written attorney-client agreement; Deseret' s
complaint to quiet title was based upon claimed assignment of a Uniform Real Estate
Contract dated 1984 from South Davis Credit Union, who was seized by the state
financial institution; Deseret has acknowledged through its counsel in open court that
Deseret obtained good legal title to the property by general warranty deed from the
successor trustee on October 20, 2011; Deseret's negotiation directly with the Trustee to
obtain the general warranty deed and a settlement agreement without consent of Fadel and
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xii

without his knowledge that the Trustee dealt directly with Deseret and its counsel after
~

the parties vacated the mediation conference room without an attorney being present and
advising the Trustee; the Attorney-Client Agreement is in writing and reproduced in
v1'

paragraph 5 of the complaint; the value of the land is at least $150,000 and accrued
rentals reasonably exceed $150,000; Fadel claims right to payment pursuant to the
Attorney-Client Agreement; Fadel provided at least 188 hours of service up to October
20, 2011, reasonably worth $250.00 per hour; Fadel has advanced costs of about
$2000.00 and has received no compensation from the Trust or any other person.
The above facts being admitted, the relief stated to be granted is set forth in the
prayer of the complaint and should be granted by application of the conclusions of law
contained in the complaint.

POINTY.
i.;j)

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN STATING THAT THERE WAS NO DISPUTE
THAT THERE WAS A MEDIATION ON OCTOBER 20, 2011, AND THAT
THERE WAS A SETTLEMENT THAT FLOWED FROM THAT MEDIATION.
It is clearly disputed by Fadel and the complaint that no mediation agreement was
prepared, approved or filed by the mediator or Fadel, and did not result from concluded
mediation, nor should the Order have recited in paragraph 8:
8. There is no dispute as to the particulars or material facts that are critical
for the Court's determination, including that there was a mediation on October 20,
2011, and that there was a settlement that flowed from that mediation.
More accurately, paragraph 8 could have stated that settlement followed after mediation
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terminated without a report from the mediator.
Mediation should be viewed similarly as arbitration, as both are treated as alternate
dispute resolutions, and as held by the Supreme Court in the case of Buckner v. Kennard,
99 P .3d 842 (Utah 2004), arbitration agreements are to be enforced according to their
terms and non-mutual preclusive effect will not be given to arbitration decisions unless
the parties have expressly so agreed. See id. at 850.
The Court is requested to consider mediation in the same light as the reasoning in
arbitration, and as such, any claim of Deseret through mediation should not preclude
consideration ofFadel's right to enforce his lien free from any claimed mediation
agreement. The allegations of paragraph 9 ofFadel's complaint allege that the Settlement
Agreement made in absence of Fadel was not through mediation, and occurred when
mediation ended without resolution, and followed after the mediation was terminated.
The trial court's conclusion in paragraph 8 of the Order that "there was a settlement that
flowed from that mediation" should not be interpreted as being a mediated agreement.
Alternate Dispute Resolution, Rule 104 Code of Ethics for ADR Providers,
precluded any mediation without the presence of George K. Fadel as attorney of record
for the Trustee by the following canons:
CANON VIII. PROCESS AND TERMS OF SETTLEMENT IN :MEDIATION
(a) As self-determination is a fundamental principle of mediation, the
mediator recognizes that the primary responsibility for the resolution of a dispute
and the forging of a settlement agreement rests with the parties and their attorneys
if represented. The mediator's obligation is to assist the disputants to reach an
28
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

informed and voluntary agreement.
CANNON III.
(h) Mediators shall inform the participants that they may withdraw from
mediation at any time and are not required to reach an agreement. However, if the
mediation is conducted pursuant to a mandatory mediation program, the mediator
shall inform the parties of any participation of that program.
Fadel was a participant by written agreement with the mediator. The importance of the
attorney's presence in mediation is also reflected in appellate procedure as indicated in
Rule 28A (d) (b), which provides in part that "participation by counsel and clients in the
mediation process or related discussions shall be mandatory."
The motion to dismiss should have been denied.

POINT VI.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING ATTORNEY'S FEES TO
APPELLEE PURSUANT TO UTAH CODE ANN.§ 78b-5-825
The relevant part of§ 78b-5-825 is the first subsection:
( 1) In court actions, the court shall award reasonable attorney fees to a prevailing
party if the court determines that the action or defense to the action was without
merit and not brought or asserted in good faith, except under subsection (2).
Utah Code Ann.§ 78-27-56 (1953) has the same requirements as the amended
UCA § 78b-5-825 (2008), and requires separate findings of three elements. First, the
claim must be "without merit." The Supreme Court in Cady v. Johnson, 671 P.2d 149
(Utah 1983), construing Utah Code Ann.§ 78-27-56 (1953), stated that the term "without
.merit" implies bordering on frivolity and the dictionary definition of "frivolous" is '" of
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little weight or importance having no basis in law or fact.'" See id. at 151.
The district court order paragraph 37 states: "Mr. Fadel's claims in the Complaint
are without merit, based upon legal determinations made in this case and in granting the
Motion to Dismiss." The court did not specify which legal determinations support a lack
of merit.
The Order, paragraph 22 states: "Consistent with the prior rulings in the First
Lawsuit, Mr. Fadel did hold, at least at that time in October 2011, an attorney's lien. That
Attorney's lien is defined by statute in Utah Code§ 38-2-7."
Paragraph 32 of the Order states:

Mr. Fadel's attorney's lien in this case is not enforceable at law because it did not
attach with any priority to the real property before the Trust conveyed the real
property to Deseret First, based upon the specific provisions of Utah Code§ 38-27; and further, there is nothing that has been argued to the Court as a matter of
equity that would justify the extension of that lien of the real property in the hands
of Deseret First.
In substance, the district court relied upon the legal issue of priority in connection
with UCA § 38-2-7 (7). There has yet to be an appellate decision construing application
of that statutory provision to a person having actual notice of the lien claim, and if priority
is determined, to what extent is that priority.
Fadel's lien attaches to personal property as alleged in paragraph 13 of the
Complaint for the claim of rentals for use of the property owned by the Trust and claimed
in the Answer and Counterclaim in previous litigation. No priority exists to defeat the
lien claim for that personal property.
30
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It does not reasonably follow that Fadel's claims were frivolous and without merit
where the district court utilized the greater part of 36 paragraphs of the order to conclude
that the claims are without merit.
In the case of In re Olympus Const. LC,215 P.3d 129 (Utah 2009), the Supreme
Court held that a claim involving a statute raised a question of first impression since the
Court had not previously interpreted the statute, and as such the claim was not frivolous.

See id at 134.
The award of attorney fees also requires findings that the action was not brought or
asserted in good faith. The district court in its order, in paragraph 38, asserts that Fadel's
claim was not brought in good faith stating that the claims of the Trust in paragraph 13 of
the Complaint are, by definition, claims that could not be brought in good faith, because
of rulings in the First Lawsuit and that those plainly precluded Mr. Fadel from asserting
0)

or maintaining any claims on behalf of the Trust.
Paragraph 13 of the Complaint merely identifies the claim of the Trust for rentals
as being personal property belonging to the Trust and concludes with a sentence:

v:J

"Deseret having actual notice ofFadel's claim to one-half of damages related to
possession after the Notice to Quit, and by statute, takes subject to the attorney's lien."
That sentence precludes the court's characterizing the claim as "asserting or maintaining
any claims on behalf of the Trust." Fadel was referring only to his claim for attorney
I..@

fees.
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None of the rulings and orders in the First Lawsuit mention the Trust's claims for
rentals, although the Answer and Counterclaim of the Trust did allege claims for rentals.
No court order addressed the claim for rentals.
The Complaint was to recover amounts due Fadel as attorney by reason of a
contract and as provided by statute. The trial court's Consolidated Findings of Fact and
Order, civil no 090700605, in the District Court for Davis County, filed December 18,
2012, is the order in the "First Lawsuit." That order does not mention claims of the trust
for rentals, however, paragraphs 1 and 4 of the "Order" read:
A. The Wrongful Lien Petition
1. Mr. Fadel is entitled to an attorney's lien under Utah Code Ann. §38-2-7.

4. Despite the invalidity of the Notice of Lien, Mr. Fadel's lien itself was
not wrongful as defined by Utah Code Ann.§ 28-9-1- (6) (a).
The Complaint, paragraph 8, references the substance of the quoted position of the Order,
dated December 18, 2012. The Complaint only references the Trust in allegations
necessary to prove his entitlement for payment of service in behalf of the Trust and makes
no claim on behalf of the Trust.
The Supreme Court, in the case of Still Standing Stable, LLC v. Allen, 122 P.3d
556 (Utah 2005), held that "'[A] finding of bad faith turns on a factual determination of a
part's subjective intent."' Id. at 559 (quoting In re Sonnenreich, 86 P.3d 712, 726 (Utah
2004)). The Court also stated that a determination of good faith under the statute
involves an independent determination, referencing In re Sonnenreich, 86 P.3d 712 (Utah
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2004), where the Court held:
[17, 18] ,I 48 We next tum to whether the OPC brought this action in good faith.
Good faith is defined as having "( 1) [a]n honest belief in the propriety of the
activities in question; (2) no intent to take unconscionable advantage of others; and
(3) no intent to, or knowledge of the fact, that the activities in question will hinder,
delay, or defraud others." Cady, 671 P.2d at 151. To establish a lack of good
faith, or "bad faith" under section 78-27-56, a party must prove that one or more of
these factors is lacking.
The district court made no determination that Fadel had no honest belief in his
claim, had intent to take unconscionable advantage of anyone, or intent to hinder, delay or
defraud others. Paragraph 39 of the Order concludes: "Therefore, Mr. Fadel's
Complaint, at least in part, has not been brought or asserted in good faith." The court
should have specified which parts of the Complaint were not brought in good faith and
which were brought in good faith. Even if an allegation of the Complaint could be
interpreted as "assertions of claims purported to be claims of the Trust like for rentals,"
this does not prove that such assertion is dishonest, where there was no evidence that
Fadel lacked an honest belief in the Trust's claim for rentals; had no intent to take
unconscionable advantage of anyone in alleging a claim for rentals, which had not been
~

adjudicated, or that he hindered, delayed or defrauded anyone.
The award of attorney fees to Deseret should be reversed.
POINT VII.
DESERET IS LIABLE TO FADEL FOR ATTORNEY FEES APART FROM
FORECLOSURE OF THE LIEN.
The Utah Court of Appeals, in Eastmond v. Earl, 912 P.2d 994 (Utah App. 1996),
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referenced decisions of the Utah Supreme Court, in holding that the defendant who
settled with the plaintiffs attorney without knowledge of plaintiff's attorney lien may be
liable to the attorney for the lien amount if the attorney is unable to collect from the party
receiving the proceeds. See id. at 996. One of the cases cited was Potter v. Ajax Mining

Co., 19 Utah 421, 57 P. 270,279 (1899)., holding that defendant who had notice of
plaintiff's attorney lien could not fraudulently defeat by settling directly with plaintiff
without knowledge of plaintiffs attorney. This case involved a written contingency fee
agreement between attorneys and a client before a statute providing for attorney's lien
(fu,

became effective. Excerpts of this case are found in this brief on pages 12-15. The Court
held that if the statute had been operative upon the cause of action in question, a lien upon
plaintiffs cause of action might have been created, and also stated that permitting the
attorneys to continue the prosecuting of the case so as to determine the amount of the lien
for compensation was proper. See id. 19 Utah at 433. The case was remanded for a new
trial based upon the law in absence of a statute.
The statute in effect in May 2009, is much broader than that referenced in Potter,
and specifically references the lien upon real property as well as personal property.

CONCLUSION
As stated by the Utah Court of Appeals in the case of Webster v. J.P. Morgan

Chase Bank NA, 290 P.3d, 930, 931 (Utah App. 2012), when determining whether the
trial court properly granted a 12 (b) (6) motion to dismiss, the Court accepts the factual
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allegations in the complaint as true and considers them and all reasonable inferences to be
drawn from them in a light most favorable to the plaintiff.
The trial court did not identify any of the factual allegations of the Complaint,
which were disputed that were critical for its decision, other than stating, "there is no
dispute that there was a mediation on October 20, 2011, and that there was a settlement
that flowed from that mediation." Accordingly, the case should be remanded to the
district court to enter judgment in favor of the Plaintiff for relief requested and supported
by allegations in the Complaint, after establishing the value of the Property, the amount of
rents due and costs advanced by Plaintiff.
-Ii

Dated this / / - day of April, 2016.
Respectfully submitted,

~klfA#

6rorg~Fadel
Attorney Pro Se
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George K. Fadel #1027
170 West 400 South
Bountiful, Utah 84010
(801) 295-2421
George@Fadellaw.com
vJ

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR DAVIS COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

~

~BORGE K. FADEL,

.

)
CO1\.1PLAINT

)

Plamtiff,
vs.

)

Case No. 15 P1. PP 6 9.1

DESERET FIRST CREDIT UNION, a
Federally chartered credit union,

)

Judge:

~

ROBERT J. DALE

)
Defendant.

1. Plaintiff is a resident of Davis County, Utah.
2. Defendant is doing business in Davis County, Utah, and claims an interest in real·
property in Bountiful, Davis County, Utah, situated at about 362 South Main Street, Bountiful,
Utah, more particularly described as follows:
BEG AT A PT 165 FT S FR NE CORNER LOT 4 BLK S, PLAT A, BTFL TS SUR, 1H
S 4 RODS, THW7RODS, THN 4RODS, THE 7RODS TOPOB. CONT. 0.17
ACRES. SERIAL NU1v.1BER 03:032:0056
Said tract is sometimes referred to herein as Property.
3. Jerry W. Parkin, Successor Trustee of The Wilma G. Parkin Family Protection Trust,

in May, 2009, requested the services of George K. Fadel to reclaim possession of the Property,
which Wilma G. Parkin had quitclaimed to herself as Trustee of the Wilma G. Parkin Family
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Trust, dated July 9, 1999 (Trust).
Deseret First Federal Credit Union (Deseret) was in possession of said tract and
endeavored to purchase the same at tax sale which was prevented by the discovery by Jerry W.
Parkin of the existence of record title in the Trust.
Deseret initially claimed the right to possession under an assignment of a uniform real
estate contract from the buyer, South Davis Credit Union. Deseret offered to reimburse the Trust
some $2,357.14 paid by the Trust to redeem the delinquent taxes in exchange for a conveyance.
4. A file in Civil No. 090700605 in the above Court contains the pleadings and
<.:tP

proceedings thereafter.

5. As of February 18, 2010, the highest offer ofDeseret for a conveyance of the tract was
$10,000.00. Jerry W. Parkin, as Successor Trustee, entered into the following written agreement
with Plaintiff.
ATTORNEY -CLIENT AGREE:rv.IBNT
TIIlS AGREE:rv.IBNT made this 18th day of February 2010, between George K. Fadel
(Attorney) and Jerry W. Parkin, Successor Trustee of THE WILMA G. PARKIN
FAMILY PROTECTION TRUST, (Trustee).

~

1. Attorney has represented the Trustee and the Trust since May 2009, in matters
relating to title to property at 362 South Main Street, Bountiful, Utah, against Deseret
Federal Credit Union.
2. Attorney has now prepared an Answer & Counterclaim against Deseret in Civil
Case #090700605 in the District Court for Davis County.
3. Attorney and Trustee hereby agree that the compensation due to the Attorney
for past service and continued service in the District Court, unless sooner resolved, will
be one-half of the amounts recovered by settlement or judgment and/or judgment in
excess of $10,000. The amounts recovered are to be measured by the value received by
cash or property or both free from claim from Deseret which could result in the Attorney
obtaining ajoint interest in the land with the Trustee after deducting $10,000.

2
~

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Witness the hands of the parties the day and year first above written.
s/ George K. Fadel
GEORGE K. FADEL
ATTORNEY

s/ Jerry W. Parkin
JERRYW.PARKIN, TRUSTEE
CLIENT

6. The value of the land is at least $150,000.00 and accrued rentals owed by Deseret
reasonably exceed $150,000.00. Accordingly, George K. Fadel is entitled to one-half ownership
in the tract as tenant in common and to one-half of the provable rental owed by Deseret, pursuant
to the express terms of the Attorney-Client Agreement.
7. By statute, Utah Code Annotated, Section 38-2-7, the compensation of an attorney is
vJ

governed by agreement between the attorney and client, express or implied, which is not
restrained by law. Said statute also provides that an attorney shall have a lien for balance of
compensation due from client, on moneys or property owned by the client, including real

ViN

property that is the subject of, or connected with, the work performed for the client and the lien
commences at the time of employment of the attorney by the client. The attorney has demanded

I.a

that the client cooperate in the litigation in accordance with the attorney-client agreement. Fadel
has advanced costs of counterclaim., jury fee, depositions and other advances approximating
$2,000.00. No payment has been made to Fadel for services rendered or as reimbursement for
costs advanced.
It is now clear that the defendant has never had title to be quieted against the Trust, by the

~

acknowledgement ofDeseret's counsel, Mr. Gregory S. Moesinger, in open court and of record
on August 12, 2012, where he claimed that Deseret obtained good legal title to the Property by
General Warranty Deed from the successor Trustee. Deseret has no claim to the Property other
than by said General Warranty Deed. Deseret's other claims to title were dismissed by Order of

3
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Dismissal With Prejudice entered in Civil No 090700605, on December 2, 2011, which
contained the following:

~

Based upon Plaintiff and Counterclaim-defendant Deseret First Federal Credit
Union, and Defendant and Counterlcaim-plaintiff Jerry W. Parkin, Successor Trustee of
The Wilma G. Parkin Family protection Turst's (the "Trust'') Stipulation for Entry of
Order of Dismissal with Prejudice, previously filed with the Court, and good cause
appearing therefore, it is ORDERED, ADJUDICATED AND DECREED:
That all ofDeseret First's and the Trust's respective claims, counterclaims, and
defenses, if any, that were either raised in the pleadings or that should have been raised in
the pleadings in the above-caption lawsuit, are hereby dismissed with prejudice, with
Deseret First and the Trust to each bear their own costs and attorneys fees.
Deseret' s claims in pleadings in said litigation being dismissed with prejudice, its only claim to

CJi

the Property is through said deed from the Trust, thus aclmowledging the interest in the Property
to have been solely from the title of the Trust. The Title of the Trust, by the Attorney-Client
Agreement is subject to Plaintiff's right to one-half ownership in the Property.
8. The trial court in civil case no. 090700605 in its Consolidated Findings of Fact and
Order, filed December 18, 2012, decrees in paragraph 1, that "Mr. Fadel is entitled to an

~

Attorney's lien under Utah Code Anri. § 38-2-7." The Court ruled further that the lien itself was
not wrongful as defined by Utah Code Ann.§ 38-9-1 (6) (a)."
9. On October 20, 2011, Deseret, Jerry Parkin, Fadel and others met at a board room at
Deseret' s office for the pwpose of mediation. After about three hours of mediation, all persons
except Fadel d_eparted from the conference room and Fadel did not see any of said persons for

~

several days. Fadel discovered some days later that Deseret negotiated directly with Jerry Parkin,
a Settlement Agreement and Mutual Release, accompanied by a General Warranty Deed, both
dated October 20, 2011, all without the lmowledge or consent of Fadel. The said General
Warranty Deed describes the Property, although by a modified description, and contains the
4
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following:
GRANTOR CONVENANTS with Grantee that Grantor is lawfully seized of the Property
in fee simple; that the Grantors have good right and lawful authority to sell and convey
the Property; that the Property is free and clear of any and all encumbrances; and the
Granters hereby full warrant the title to the Property and will defend the same against the
lawful claims of all persons whomsoever.
The Settlement Agreement includes the following indemnification:
J.
Indemnification. The Trust agrees to indemnify, defend, hold harmless, and
reimburse Deseret First from and for all liabilities, judgments, settlements, losses,
damages, property damage, liens, attorneys' liens, consequential damages, punitive
damages, costs, expenses, tax.es, interest, fines and penalties, including, without limitation
attorneys' fees, court costs, arbitration costs, mediation costs, costs of investigation,
settlement costs, and other litigation expenses, of every kind and nature, relating to any
and all claims, actions, disputes, suits, proceedings, demands, inquiries and investigations
asserted against Deseret First relating to any lien or encumbrance effecting the
marketability or insurability of title to the Property, including any lien claims from
George K.. Fadel, The Fadel Law Finn, and/or their successors and assigns.
The said General Warranty Deed and the Settlement Agreement were prepared by counsel for
Deseret without an attorney being present and advising the Trustee.
10. The defendant is equally obligated to Plaintiff as that of the Trustee and the Trust.
11. Without claims by Deseret under the Settlement Agreement and General Warranty
Deed, Deseret would have no claim to title to the Property, and being equally obligated to the
Plaintiff, the Plaintiff is entitled to compensation pursuant to the Attorney-Client Agreement for
a one-half interest in the real property as tenant in common and one-half of the Trust's claim for
rents after deducting $10,000.00.
12. As of the date of mediation, October 20,2011, Plaintiff had provided at least 188
house of service, which apart from the contingency fee agreement would reasonably be worth
$250.00 per her or $47,000 as of October 20, 2011, which should bear interest at ten percent per

5

(j)
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annum until paid. The costs advanced by Plaintiff should be awarded together with interest.
Files of the attorney in this case are over four feet in length and the records on file in the litigated
case reflect the magnitude of service rendered by the attorney.
However, because the Attorney-Client Agreement is unambiguous and is not overly
verbose, it is enforceable equally against the defendant as against the Trust, consistent with the
holding of the Utah Supreme Court in the case of Reddv. Hill, 304 P.3d 861 (Utah 2013) and
opinions of the Court of Appeals that contingent fee contracts are enforceable equally against the
client and the opposing party. Eastmond v. Earl, 912 P.2d 994 (Utah App 1996).
The United States Supreme Court, in the case of Venegas v Mitchell, 495 U. S. 82 (1990),
concluded that"[w]hat a plaintiff may be bound to pay and what an attorney is free to collect
under a fee agreement are not necessarily measured by the 'reasonable attorney's fee' that a
defendant must pay pursuant to a court order. Section 1988 itself does not interfere with the
enforceability of a contingent fee contract."

13. In addition to entitlement of the plaintiff to a joint interest in the real property, the
claim of the Trust to rentals is equally important and enforceable. The Trust had a bona fide
claim to rentals at least dating from four years before February 19, 2010, the date at which the
Trust filed its Answer and Counterclaim. The Trust served a Notice to Quit upon the defendant,
dated January 10, 2010, requiring Deseret to negotiate with the Trustee for a reasonable rent of
the Property (legal description included), and in absence of negotiation of a rental agreement, to
vacate the property and restore possession to the Successor Trustee for the Trust within the stated
60 day period or legal proceedings may be instituted against Deseret for relief as provided by
law.

6
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Deseret did not negotiate for rental or vacate. By letter, dated June 10, 2010, the Trustee
advised Deseret that they had not responded to the Notice to Quit, that a reasonable market value
of rent for the premises is at least $1,000.00 per month; that by law, damages for nonpayment of
rent after service of notice to quite can include three times the rental value, and thus it would be
reasonable for Deseret to negotiate for a monthly rental of $1,000.00. Deseret never pursued the
rental offer. The Trust, as owner in fee simple of the Property was entitled to rental and damages
from February 19, 2006, at least until the ill-fated General Warranty Deed, dated October 2011, a
term of 68 months plus annual interest at ten percent per annum until paid. Plaintiff's share of
rental and damages, one-half could reasonably be determined to be $102,000 plus interest.
Deseret having actual notice of Fadel's claim to one-half of damages related to possession after
Notice to Quit, and by statute, takes subject to the attorney's lien.
~

Wherefore, Plaintiff requests relief as follows:
a. For judgment foreclosing the attorney's lien on the Property, awarding Plaintiff an
undivided one-half interest therein as tenant in common with the defendant.
b. For money judgment for Plaintiff's entitlement for rentals and damages together with
interest.
c. For reimbursement of costs advanced by Plaintiff up to October 20, 2011, and for such
related relief as the Court deems reasonable and appropriate including the protection of the Trust
from any further claim.
Dated this 15th day of July, 2015.

-~

~

_/ 17

- ~h-<7~M
· 7rg--: Fadel
Attorney Pro-Se
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The Order of the Court is stated below: / ..
~ E
Dated: January 21, 2016
Isl Noel St\
12:40:01 PM
Districf\

--

- ·~

-~-

~

v;j

Wallace 0. Felsted (1054)
Gregory S. Moesinger (10680)
KIRTON McCONKIE
Kirton McConkie Building, Fourth Floor
50 East South Temple
P.O. Box45120
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0120
Telephone: (801) 328-3600
wfelsted@ktnclaw.com
gmoesinger@ktnclaw.com
Attorneys for Defendant Deseret First Credit Union

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR

WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
GEORGE K. FADEL, an individual,

ORDER OF DISl\.fiSSAL AND
AWARD OF ATTORNEYS' FEES

Plaintiff,
vs.
DESERET FIRST CREDIT UNION, a
federally chartered credit union,

Civil No. 150906526
(Formerly Civil No. 150700691)
Judge Noel S. Hyde

Defendant.

This matter came before the Court on defendant Deseret First Credit Union's ("Deseret
First'' or the "Defendant") Motion to Dismiss, which was filed on August 11, 2015. The Motion
to Dismiss was fully briefed and submitted for decision. The Court heard oral argument on the
Motion to Dismiss on November 24, 2015 at 11:00 am. Attorney Gregory S. Moesinger, of
Kirton McConkie, appeared on behalf of Deseret First; attorney George K. Fadel appeared on
behalf of himself, the plaintiff ("Mr. Fadel" or the "Plaintiff'). At the conclusion of the hearing,
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the Court delivered its ruling and decision orally.
The Court reviewed the Plaintiff's Complaint in this matter, considered the submissions
of the parties in support of and opposition to the Motion to Dismiss, and heard the arguments of
counsel orally at the hearing. The Court has further reviewed the underlying litigation in the
matter captioned Deseret First Credit Union v. Jerry W Parkin, Successor Trustee of the Wilma

G. Parkin Family Protection Trust, et al., filed in the Second Judicial District Court, in and for
Davis County, State of Utah, Civil. No. 090700605, including the results of the mediation, the
settlement, and dismissal of that action, as well as the decisions reached by the Utah Court of
Appeals in Deseret First Federal Credit Union v. Jerry W Parkin, Successor Trustee of the

Wilma G. Parkin Family Protection Trust, 2012 UT App 140, ,I 6, 278 P.3d 630, and Deseret
First Federal Credit Union v. Jerry W Parkin, Successor Trustee of the Wilma G. Parkin
Family Protection Trust, 2014 UT App 267,339 P.3d 471 (cert. denied) (hereinafter and
collectively the "First Lawsuit"). And the Court is otherwise familiar with this matter and able
to issue a decision on the Motion to Dismiss.
For the reasons set forth on the record at the November 24, 2015 hearing, which are all
incorporated herein by this reference, THE COURT HEREBY ORDERS AND DECREES:
1.

Deseret First' s Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED.

2.

Mr. Fadel's Complaint is DIS:rvITSSED with prejudice and on the merits.

3.

In ruling on and reviewing a motion to dismiss, the Court accepts as
accurate or true all factual allegations of the Complaint, and the Court
must determine, based upon those allegations, whether they support a
claim for relief.
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4.

If in that process, additional facts and allegations, that are not set forth in
the Complaint, are brought to the attention of the Court and considered,
then the Court will apply the standards which are utilized in ruling on a
motion for ~mmmary judgment.

~

5.

Furthermore, the factual materials are viewed in a light most favorable to
the party opposing the relief, which, in this case, is Mr. Fadel.

6.

In ruling on a motion to dismiss or a motion for summary judgment, the
legal basis must be sufficient to support dismissal of the Complaint as a
matter of law.

7.

Under established case law, particularly under Orvis v. Johnson, 2008 UT
2, 177 P .3d 600, there are two steps that the Court must review in
summary judgment matters. The Court has been presented facts which go

beyond the allegations in the Complaint. Those facts have included
references to the underlying bases upon which Mr. Fadel's attorneys' lien
was asserted, and also facts relative to the filing of Mr. Fadel's notice of
the attorneys' lien.

8.

Th~ no dispute as to the particular or material facts that are criticai for
the Court's determination,
including that there is no dispute that there was
·..._,.
a mediation on October 20, 2011, and that there was a settlement that
flowed from that mediation.

9.

There is also no dispute that as a result of that settlement, there was an
exchange between Deseret First and Jerry W. Parkin, Successor Trustee of
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the Wilma G. Parkin Family Protection Trust (the "Trust"), which
included the payment of $30,000 by Deseret First to the Trust, and the
delivery of a General Warranty Deed by the Trust to Deseret First, all on
October 20, 2011.
10.

The General Warranty Deed was recorded on October 21, 2011.

11.

Mr. Fadel recorded his Notice of Attorney's Lien (the ''Notice of Lien")
with the Davis County Recorder's Office on October 24, 2011.

12.

The Court is mindful that Mr. Fadel does not agree with Deseret First's
and the Trust's settlement, and Mr. Fadel has argued that settlement and
dismissal should be set aside. However, those are not issues before this
Court. Those were issues for the First Lawsuit, and they are left to the
First Lawsuit. The filing of an action in this case does not and will not
constitute a valid collateral attack on a final determination in the First
Lawsuit.

13.

Questions relating to the First Litigation, including as to its propriety,
underpinnings of the settlement, and the events relating to the mediation,
are not before the Court and not considered in these proceedings.

14.

Statements made by counsel at oral argument are not evidence.

15.

Furthermore, Mr. Fadel's Complaint contains many statements that are not
factual allegations. The Complaint contains various legal arguments, and
such legal arguments are not presumed to be accurate, but they are simply
considered like any other argument by counsel.
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~

16.

There are at least three allegations in the Complaint, specifically
paragraphs 10, 12 and 13, which constitute or contain legal conclusions,

~

not factual allegations, and which are not correct statements of the law.
The Court is not persuaded by those arguments.
~

17.

Moreover, in paragraph 13 of the Complaint, Mr. Fadel alleges, "In
addition to entitlement of [Mr. Fadel] to a joint interest in the real
property, the claim of the Trust to rentals is equally important and

~

enforceable." In that paragraph, it appears that Mr. Fadel is attempting to
assert a claim on behalf of the Trust, by suggesting that the Trust has an
enforceable claim for rentals against Deseret First. The Trust was Mr.

~

Fadel's former client. That representation was terminated in 2011. Mr.
Fadel is not in the position to assert any claim for the Trust, and he does
~

not stand in the shoes of the Trust.
18.

That issue of asserting claims that belonged to the Trust was decided in
the First Lawsuit Mr. Fadel does not and cannot represent the interests of
the Trust with respect to challenging the settlement or the other issues
addressed in the First Lawsuit.

19.

Those rulings have already been made and are binding on this Court.

20.

Res Judicata applies to those questions because they were assertions of
claims for the Trust addressed through the settlement and dismissal. Mr.
Fadel is legally incapable of asserting claims on behalf of the Trust or that
belong to the Trust. He has no standing to do so. He has no legal

~
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authorization. That lack of authorization has been confirmed and affirmed

in the First Lawsuit.
21.

Rather, at issue before the Court is the attorney's lien asserted by Mr.
Fadel against Deseret First and its real property that was identified in, and
conveyed by, the Trust's October 20, 2011 General Warranty Deed to
Deseret First.

22.

Consistent with the prior rulings in the First Lawsuit, Mr. Fadel did hold,
at least at that time in October 2011, an attorney's lien. That attorney's
lien is defined by statute in Utah Code§ 38-2-7.

23.

The Court notes and clarifies that Utah Code § 38-2-7 has been modified
as recently as 2015. Counsel has made arguments with respect to
subparagraph 7, under the prior version of the Utah Code (pre-2015).
Those provisions are now found at subparagraphs 8 and 9, of the 2015
version of the Utah Code. Substantively, those provisions have not
changed but have been renumbered.

24.

Utah Code§ 38-2-7(7), as of the time Mr. Fadel first asserted his lien, or
Utah Code § 38-2-7(8) and (9) (2015), is the proper basis for the analysis,
is binding upon this Court, and it is dispositive of this case. That section
of the Utah Code provides:

l,

Any person who takes an interest in any property, other than real property, that is
subject to an attorney's lien with actual or constructive knowledge of the
attorney's lien, takes his or her interest subject to the attorney's lien. An attomey1s
lien on real property has as its priority the date and time when a notice of lien is
filed with the county recorder of the county in which real property that is subject
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to a lien under this section is located.
25.

The attorney's lien attaches to the property of the client. It does not attach
to the property of anyone other than the client.

26.

The statute makes a specific exclusion from the general rule of attachment
for real property. As for real property, an attorney's lien has as its priority
the date and time when a notice of lien is filed or recorded with the county
recorder of the county. It has no priority prior to that statutorily defined
date.

27.

Mr. Fadel's October 24, 2011 Notice of Lien was a nullity, and had no
force and effect, based upon Judge Hamilton's Consolidated Findings of
Fact and Order entered on or about December 18, 2012 (the "Consolidated
Order") in the First Lawsuit.

28.

There is no other notice of record of any attorneys' lien of Mr. Fadel,
which has been brought to the attention of this Court.

29.

Accordingly, there is no notice of record of any attorney's lien for Mr.
Fadel. Based upon the absence of any notice, no priority can be
established for any attorney's lien in any real property of the client (i.e.,
the Trust) previously represented by Mr. Fadel. It follows that no priority
can be established in any real property of anyone else, including Deseret
First.

30.

Mr. Fadel's current assertion of the right to foreclose an attorney's lien
.:@

against real property must be supported by some appropriate and legally
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sufficient interest in that real property. Because there is no recorded
notice of lien in this case, there is not and cannot be a valid or enforceable
lien on the real property currently owned by Deseret First or as identified

in the General Warranty Deed that was recorded on October 21, 2011.
~

31.

As a matter of law, Mr. Fadel has no lien on Deseret First's real property
on which he could foreclose.

32.

Mr. Fadel's attorney's lien in this case is not enforceable at law because it
did not attach with any priority to the real property before the Trust

-

conveyed the real property to Deseret First, based upon the specific
provisions of Utah Code§ 38-2-7; and further, there is nothing that has
been argued to the Court as a matter of equity that would justify the
extension of that lien of the real property in the hands ofDeseret First.
33.

Based upon all of the facts, the Complaint does not set forth a valid legal
basis upon which a claim may be maintained against Deseret First

34.

In summary judgment language, there are no material facts in dispute, the
legal arguments raised by Mr. Fadel are erroneous and not persuasive, and
Deseret First is entitled to the requested relief--dism.issal of the action

with prejudice, as a matter of law.
35.

Moreover, the Court determines that Utah Code § 78B-5-825 applies and
requires the awarding of reasonable attorney's fees to Deseret First. That
section of the Utah Code provides as follows:

(1) In civil actions, the court shall award reasonable attorney fees to a prevailing
~
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party if the court determines that the action or defense to the action was without
merit and not brought or asserted in good faith, except under Subsection (2).

(2) The court, in its discretion, may award no fees or limited fees against a party
under Subsection(l ), but only if the court:
(a) finds the party has filed an affidavit of impecuniosity in the action before the
court; or
(b) the court enters in the record the reason for not awarding fees under the
provisions of Subsection (1 ).
36.

Deseret First is the prevailing party in this matter.

37.

Mr. Fadel' s claims in the Complaint are without merit, based upon the
legal determinations made in this case and in granting the Motion to
Dismiss.

38.

Furthermore, Mr. Fadel's claims in the Complaint were not brought or
asserted in good faith. For example, in this case, the assertion of claims
purported to be claims of the Trust, like for rentals in paragraph 13 of the
Complaint, are, by definition, claims that could not be brought in good
faith, because of the rulings and orders in the First Lawsuit. Those plainly
precluded Mr. Fadel from asserting or maintaining any claims on behalf of
the Trust.

39.

Mr. Fadel was aware of those limitations and restrictions, and to assert a
claim in the face of those rulings and orders, which have been repeatedly
stated and affirmed on appeal, does not and cannot consti~te-a..good faith
basis for the pursuit of those claims. Therefore, Mr. Fadel's Complaint, at
least in part, has not been brought or asserted in good faith.

40.
~

Accordingly, the Court hereby awards attorney's fees in favor ofDeseret
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First, and against Mr. Fadel, in the amount of $2,000, for the attorneys'
fees it incurred in this action.
41.

On the record at the hearing, Mr. Fadel represented that he was not
impecunious, and Mr. Fadel waived and renounced his right and option to
submit an affidavit of impecuniosity in the action before the Court under

~

Utah Code § 78B-5-825(2)(a).
42.
VJ

The Court determines that the sum of $2,000 in sanctions and as an award
of attorneys' fees to Deseret First is reasonable based upon the Court's
review of the materials that have been prepared, the nature of the briefing
that has been presented, the oral argument, and the overall time that has
been involved. Furthermore, by comparison, $2,000 is less than the
amounts previously sanctioned against Mr. Fadel in the Consolidated
Order.

43.

Moreover, to go through an additional process of submitting an affidavit
and appearing for a hearing would likely cause Desert First to incur an
amount in excess of $2,000, and it is not appropriate to impose thqse costs
and expenses on either party. Accordingly, the sum of $2,000 is,-,,\
appropriate, and it avoids further litigation on whether $2,000 is

~

)

reasonable.
44.

This is the final ruling and order of the Court, and it shall be considered
the disposition of this matter, addressing all of the issues in this case. The
Court does not anticipate the submission of any further or additional
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documentation or consideration of these issues.
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I hereby certify that on the 15th day of January, 2016, I caused a true and correct copy of
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served upon the following by the method indicated:

George K. Fadel
Attorney at Law
170 West 400 South
Bountiful, UT 84010
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